Container ship fires

The fire on board the 2017 built MAERSK HONAM in March 2018 i.e. within a year of her launch, will forever remain etched on the minds of cargo underwriters. A modern, cellular container ship designed to carry 15,000 TEUs, best of design and construction (Hyundai Shipyard), the most advanced fire-fighting systems protecting each container, well-trained and experienced crew and belonging to one of the giants in the shipping industry………. yet she was devastated by this fire. A fire of such serious proportions that all attempts of the crew to fight it failed, they had to send out a SOS message and finally the crew had to abandon the ship. Five lives were lost in this tragic incident in the Arabian Sea, around 900 nautical miles off the Indian coast.

The shipowners declared General average and when the salvage security sought was 42.5% of the CIF value of the cargo & GA security was 11.5%, the cargo insurers as well as cargo owners ( who had not taken insurance) were jolted out of their comfort. 54% of the cargo value as security to take possession of the safe cargo was something unheard of. Typically, the salvage security plus GA security would be largely in the range of 20-30% of cargo value. Had the cargo not been insured, an owner of cargo worth say US$ 1 million had to fork out a deposit of US$ 540,000 to take delivery of his sound cargo. It must be noted that a Fire accident on board a vessel damaging cargo cannot be considered as a General average. It is the fire-fighting expenses and losses during fire-fighting, salvaging the entire vessel which will form part of General Average The Maersk Honam tragedy also brought home the importance of cargo insurance to cargo owners who were reluctant to buy insurance.

Container ship fires continue to happen with alarming regularity — In recent years fires have occurred on board APL Vancouver, E.R.Kobe, Yantian Express, Olga Maersk and many more. What could be the reasons for fires on container ships? The reasons cited often are:

1) Age of the vessel and its condition not fully conducive to safety. The fire-fighting systems being outdated or not capable of proper functioning.

2) Inexperienced or untrained crew members

3) Vessels not having a clearly defined SOP/ Stowage plan for different types of containers/cargo and even if they have the same, not following it for a variety of reasons.

4) Cargo not appropriately classified under the IMDG Code erroneously and the shipping line being unaware of it.

5) Perhaps, the most important reason cited is wilful mis-declaration of cargo by the shipper to take advantage of lesser freight and to avoid the attendant hassles of a dangerous cargo.

The final report submitted by the Tranport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore ( TSIB) in accordance with the Casualty Investigation Code under SOLAS Regulation XI-1/6 adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution MSC 255(84), relating to Maersk Honam fire accident throws up a new set of reasons — reasons which may necessitate having a re-look at the IMDG classification of cargo and the very basis of classification.

The investigating team could not conclusively establish the cause of fire as almost all evidence was destroyed in the fire itself. Going by the interviews with the surviving crew members and available records, the team was able to piece together sequence of events leading to the major fire. Statements by the crew indicated that the smoke emanating from Cargo Hold 3 had a strong chlorine smell, created irritation and breathlessness. This pointed to the cargo in the hold having a strong chlorine content. It was found that of the 59 containers holding IMDG Class 9 cargo, 54 contained SDID (Sodium Dichloroisocyanuric acid).

SDID is to be classed under 5.1 of the IMDG Code of dangerous goods & the handling, packing, segregation and stowage be done accordingly. Interestingly in terms of Special provision 135, the IMDG Code had exempted SDID from being classed as dangerous goods and be classed under Class 9 i.e. environmentally hazardous substance, thereby attracting the relevant protocols applicable to this class. SDID is used largely in the manufacture of bleaches, detergent sanitizers, swimming pool disinfectants, etc. This Special Provision was given in 1980 and the investigating report recommends that the classification of cargo under IMDG be re-looked. Why?

The forensic investigation revealed that there had been no mis-declaration of cargo as per booking records. It was indeed declared as Class 9 cargo. The stowage and segregation protocols applicable to Class 9 cargo was strictly followed. Electric fire was ruled out as also fire emanating from the bunker tanks and other Class 5.1 cargo whose chemical properties revealed very little or no presence of chlorine. Self-decomposition of SDID at temperatures of around 50 degrees celsius or even lower though its stated properties mention decomposition at over 200 degrees celsius was identified as the possible cause of fire.. The IMDG Code had recognised the primary hazard of SDID and classed it under 9, disregarding the secondary hazard of decomposition at relatively low temperatures.One may wonder what would have been the difference had SDID been classed under 5.1 of the IMDG Code. Well, the storage protocols would have been different. The report also suggests a review of the fire-fighting procedures/equipment on board vessels . In the instant case, Maersk Honam’s documented procedures allowed cargo classed under 5.1 and 9 of IMDG Code to be carried under-deck or on the open weather deck. The cargo was accordingly carried under-deck in this case. The problem was that chlorine-related fires cannot be fought with CO2 fire-fighting systems but would need copious quantities of water to be sprayed. Maersk Honam had an elaborate CO2 based fire-fighting system, which proved inadequate. Flooding of the hold with water was not possible. Had IMDG Code specified that Class 5.1 and Class 9 cargo or any cargo capable of decomposition.instability /containing chlorine be carried on the open deck, but away from direct sunlight, which would have provided ample opportunity for using water-jets to fight the fire.

Hindsight is always prescriptive. about what could have been. Nevertheless, time for the IMDG Code to be carefully reviewed. While mis-declaration of cargo is rampant and stringent steps taken to curb the same, all container ship fires cannot be solely attributed to mis-declaration as this investigation report reveals.