As 2020 meanders to a close and with streaks of positivity being seen, as Covid vaccines become a reality, there comes the shocking news about ONE Apus.

The ONE Apus, a container boxship built in 2019 and flying a Japanese flag has a capacity to carry 14,000 TEUs. On a voyage from China to the US of A, on November 30th, she encountered rough weather and over 1800 containers fell overboard as the container stacks collapsed and even the ones on board would have been damaged and their odd positions definitely would have endangered the vessel, cargo and human lives. This is without considering the damages which the floating containers could cause to shipping traffic, pollution resulting from cargo coming out of these containers and the threat to aquatic life. It is said that some of the containers lost overboard carried dangerous cargo including fireworks. Loss estimates which initially were US $ 50 million have now gone up to around US $ 200 million. Early days. The vessel has deviated from the original voyage route and berthed at the port of Kobe in Japan. The vessel with its containers is being checked for safety and once declared safe, the other operations of surveys, safe removal of sound units and loss minimisation in respect of damaged ones, etc. will take place.
The cargo liabilities are going to be huge. So, will the shipping company take the defence that the vessel was in good condition and they had taken utmost care, were not negligent and it was extreme weather which caused the loss and hence as per BL conditions ( The Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules) they should not be held liable? In all probability, yes, but there are divergent rulings considering if it was indeed ‘ extreme weather’. Any weather conditions which could be forecast and avoided will not come under extreme weather or heavy weather.It may be difficult to establish that it was solely extreme weather which led to the loss. Another question being debated is, whether the shipowners will declare General Average. Again opinion is divided. General average would involve a’ voluntary act or sacrifice which is reasonably incurred/done to save the voyage when faced with a peril’. So the loss caused by bad weather will not be General Average but costs incurred to save the voyage/adventure will be. In the instant case, the costs incurred in taking the vessel to the port of Kobe and attendant steps taken to save the ship and cargo alone could fall under General average. One can rest assured that there are going to be legal challenges to whatever stand the shipping company takes. Claiming against the shipping line will also involve legal complexities — the conditions of the different House BLs and Master BLs issued, the geography whose Law would be made applicable, establishing negligence on part of the vessel and more importantly questions of ownership of cargo i.e. if risk has passed from the seller to buyer in terms of completion of documentation. Long-drawn legal battles can be expected.
Leaving the legal battles to the lawyers, let us focus on what are the possible reasons apart from ‘heavy weather’ which can lead to container stacks getting disturbed/collapsed and containers falling overboard. Although no concrete data is made available,estimates say that on an average 775-1300 containers are lost overboard every year. As instances may be small, involving a few containers at a time, most of them do not get reported. It is only when a loss as big as this comes up that the spotlight is on the reasons for containers falling overboard and what could be done to avoid the same.
However safe and modern the ship, she will be no match before Nature’s fury. So extreme weather is the main reason for casualties of this type. The other reasons which we see are man-made and with greater care, caution and lesser avarice, can definitely be avoided or reduced. At the top of this list of reasons is Mis-declaration of stuffed container weights. Studies in the US have shown that mis-declaration of weights by shippers happen in almost 20% of total containers shipped and the weight difference can be as high as 2-3 MT per container. The stowage plans of the vessels get impacted due to this and often heavier containers are placed on top lighter ones in the higher tiers of the stack. This leads to increased pressure, not only on the lashing gear but also on the containers in the lower tiers, creating safety and operational issues.
A second reason for stack collapses is again attributed to shippers – Improper stuffing of cargo inside the containers. If the cargo inside is not properly chocked or if there is improper dunnage, during the various movements of the vessel( especially in bad weather), the weight of the cargo can split open the side walls of the container leading to structural damage and loosening/collapse of the container stack. This problem gets aggravated when the container is overloaded as well.
Poor condition of containers, especially during periods of high demand can also lead to these types of accidents. Here, the shipping line too needs to take responsibility for permitting cargo movements in such containers. Even in cases where containers are in sound condition,properly stuffed and correct weights declared, collapse of stacks can happen because of grave errors on part of the ships’s crew. This can take the form of Wrong stowage plan( although softwares decide the plan these days, there is scope for human error too), Improper & Insufficient lashing due to error in mathematical calculations or lashing equipment being faulty.
Height of stacks – Container ship designs are such that three-fourths of the total number of containers carried are on deck. The typical height of stacks below deck is 9 containers while on-deck it is 8 containers. With high stacks, the main problem is if one container breaks/shifts or gets damaged, the entire stack is likely to collapse, as stated in a publication of the Lloyds Register. Further very high container stacks on-deck could affect vessel’s stability ( compounded by wrongly declared weights and bad weather) and also visibility from the bridge. However, ships try to make best use of space available and carry as many containers as possible, at times overlooking the flip-side.
Faulty connections between containers – In addition to lashing, containers in a stack are connected to each other through Bottom Twist-locks. Replacement of semi-automatic twist-locks with Fully-automated twist-locks ( FATs) in certain ports also appear to weaken the stacks since failure rate in FATs is relatively higher.
Ship crew’s inability/ error is the last but certainly not the least of the reasons for these type of accidents. A vessel rolls, pitches, sways, surges & heaves subjecting the container stacks on-deck to extreme pressure. This gets accentuated with heavy winds and huge waves breaking over deck. During these times, the skills and decision-making abilities of the Master and crew are put to test. Often it is found that precautionary measures like changing course early or reducing speed are not taken.
The Surfrider Foundation Europe has come out with a set of recommendations for preventing/reducing loss of containers overboard. First and foremost the recommendation is to be transparent and declare all container losses so that there is greater visibility and possibility of tracing the containers gone overboard. The Foundation also suggests standardising the legal status and associated liabilities with lost containers and their cargo. While these measures emphasise the data-mining and legal aspects of these accidents post-occurrence, the Surfrider Foundation Europe’s four recommendations for prevention/reduction of container losses are detailed below:
Vessels over 20 years old should not be allowed to carry containerised cargo.
Surprise inspections at ports to check stowage conditions, weight of containers vis-a-vis declared weights, condition of containers including twist-locks.
Study the link between loaded containers on-deck and stack collapses paving the way for limiting number of loaded containers/height of stacks on-deck.
Introduce a tolerance limit on weight declarations and if the actual weight exceeds the declared weight by more than 2%, all liabilities will be that of the shipper.
None of these measures have been implemented yet by the IMO or member nations on a large scale and hence accidents like that of ONE Apus continue to happen leading to huge economic losses and endangering human and aquatic lives as well. Hopefully, better sense will prevail post this accident.
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We often get enlightened post happening of an event. Yes there must be multiple causes leading to losses of such magnitude but extreme weather must rank high up and in most cases beyond human planning. An interesting insight into various other reasons makes this broadcast so interesting- always get to learn things new. Your last line about some recommendations about not allowing container ships over 20years will be death knell for shipping industry which is already tottering. If all such recommendations were to be complied with in letter and spirit possibly we will end up paying high freight that would lead to collapse of the global economy as well. So we need to balance between theory and practicality.
Very true but gradually some countries may start implementing it.
Dear Sir,
Very interesting article in deed.
Being a master mariner in command of container ships for last 20byears I am professionally prepared to assess that your conclusions are valid with probably one exemption. It is the weight of the cargo inside the containers. Since 2016 when SOLAs convention made it mandatory to declare mass of the cargo and the container ( so called Verified Gross Mass Declaration or VGM for short )I observed that the mass of the containers is 99% correct. Prudent mariners check the calculations of the stability with the actual reading of draft (at least). From that I know how huge difference obligatory declarations of VGM made in practice.
The case of ONE Apus is a mistery to me. For the last 7 years I command ships of similar or bigger size and still I would not dare to jump to a conclusions without details of the accident. Having experience from the Pacific and knowing that in general the Stevedores in China do a food job with lashing of cargo I would expect parametric rolling as a major factor to be considered. But this is just a guess based on my gut feeling. I have insufficient data to assess better.
I value your article and hope to see more
Best regards
Thank you Captain for bringing in the perspective of VGM. Will need to study and research this in greater detail, especially how diligently it is followed in different geographies. Thanx yet again.